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Recent findings show that colour processing, like most
other sensory attributes, is shaped by experience.
While such studies can reveal the mechanisms of
development, can they also help uncover the mecha-
nisms of perception?
Understanding the morphogenesis of the brain is a
wonderful challenge for neurobiologists: investigating
how nerve cells and their connections are organised
into a coherent functional unit is both intrinsically inter-
esting, and medically relevant. As more is known about
the visual part of the brain than any other, it is not sur-
prising that much work has focused on visual develop-
ment. And measuring how abnormal experience affects
this process has been an integral tool in demonstrating
that experience can significantly alter the physiological
landscape of vision (for example, see [1–4]). 
From the several recent studies, one can now add
colour vision to the list of perceptual modalities that
are modulated by experience. For instance, it has been
reported that the organisation of the primary visual
cortex is different in people lacking a functional cone
system — so-called ‘rod monochromats’ — who are
consequently colour blind. What Baseler et al. [5] dis-
covered was that the area of cortex that normally
receives information only from the central part of the
retina — the foveola — is activated by the rod system
in rod monochromats. Because there are no rods in the
foveola in either these or normal individuals, this
central activation could only arise from a reorganisa-
tion of the primary visual cortex resulting from their
altered visual experience.
Another piece of evidence for the plasticity of the
colour processing involves the perception of unique
yellow. While many different colour terms are typically
used to describe colour experience that vary from
culture to culture, all sensations of colour reduce to one
of four perceptual categories (five if you include grey-
ness): redness, yellowness, greenness and blueness [6].
So, for any individual with normal colour vision, there
should be a specific wavelength that causes a ‘unique’
sensation of yellow, that is, a colour percept that con-
tains neither redness nor greenness (the same of
course should be true for perceptions of red, green and
blue). Recent results have shown that the identity of this
wavelength remains fairly constant from individual to
individual [7]. What makes this result unexpected is the
known variability in the underlying retinal architecture in
humans, which one might expect would cause large
variations in the physical locus of unique yellow. The
reason that it does not, it seems, is because — through
experience — the visual system compensates for 
the genetically determined differences in colour pro-
cessing [8].
Further studies also suggest a role for experience in
‘higher-level’ aspects of colour perception. As reported
recently in Current Biology, Yoichi Sugita [9] raised
monkeys in fairly extreme conditions of visual depriva-
tion, in which each animal spent their first year of life in
a room illuminated for 12 hours a day by monochro-
matic lights. Throughout the light cycle, the illuminant
would switch randomly between four monochromatic
lights every minute. As a result of this unusual experi-
ence, the monkeys’ colour perception was degraded in
two ways: first, their judgments of colour similarity dif-
fered (fairly incoherently) from control animals; and
second, they were unable to recognise a target surface
under an illuminant they had not experienced [9]. A
similar effect on perception has also been observed in
fish raised under a single chromatic light [10]. Thus,
colour perception, like that of motion, form, sound and
touch, is modulated by experience.
Developmental studies such as these provide
considerable insight into the principles that guide the
formation of the visual system. What they do not tell us
is how and why we (and other animals) see what we do.
But then that was not their original intention. After all,
whilst the formation of ocular dominance columns and
the like have been the principle focus of developmental
neuroscience [4], whether these structures are neces-
sary for perception is still a matter of debate [11].
Rather, the aim of such studies is to understand how
the visual system is formed, not how the formed system
functions. Nonetheless, augmenting experience during
development does have the potential to tell us a great
deal about the principles of perception.
To understand why, consider what sensations of
colour ‘represent’. Everyday experience suggests that
we see an accurate representation of a world
composed of differently colored objects of various
sizes, orientations and locations in three-dimensional
space. This common sense impression is extraordinary,
given that the two-dimensional patterns of light that fall
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Figure 1. An illusion of simultaneous brightness contrast (see
text for explanation).
on the retina completely lack these attributes. For
instance, despite the wide diversity and continuity of
spectral stimuli, and even though the physical dimen-
sion that describes light is linear from 400–700 nm, we
experience a circular relationship of only four opponent
colour categories, each defined by a unique colour sen-
sation (see [12] and citations therein for why this may
be the case). This lack of isomorphism between stimuli
and perception would, however, be trivial if there were
a simple one-to-one relationship between objects in the
world and the stimuli they generate — all the visual
brain would have to do is represent each relationship,
say between a particular reflectance and its corre-
sponding stimulus, as one color or another. 
The deeper problem is that visual stimuli are in fact
determined by multiple real-world factors — reflectance
and illumination in the case of colour. As a result, any
given stimulus could have arisen from an infinite
number of different sources. Vision must overcome this
ambiguity if it is to usefully guide behaviour; this is
rather like trying to solve the equation x*y = z for x
without ever knowing y. Though a seemingly impossi-
ble task, visual animals from bees to humans ‘recog-
nize’ objects under different illuminants, a phenomenon
called color constancy (for example, see [13–15]). Given
the indeterminate nature of stimulus information for
behaviour, the only way this can be achieved is empiri-
cally: by shaping perception and processing according
to the statistics of experience [15–20].
The colours that we, and presumably other animals,
see are thus accurate representations neither of the
physical world — with which we have no direct access
— nor of the physical qualities of light stimuli (which
would be behaviourally useless given their inherent
ambiguity). Rather, they represent an empirical, and
thus probabilistic, correlation between a stimulus and
sources that have typically generated similar stimuli in
past experience. 
To illustrate this important point, consider Figures 1
and 2. Figure 1 is a demonstration of the well-known
‘illusion’ called simultaneous brightness contrast. The
two central squares are physically identical (as shown
in the key below), but appear to differ in brightness as
a consequence of their different surrounds (bright on
the dark surround and dark on the light surround). Thus,
as is true in so many other aspects of what the brain
does, context is everything when it comes to the
colours we see. Indeed, a single patch of light can be
made to appear red, green, blue, yellow, black or white
depending on the information that surrounds it (exam-
ples can be found at www.lottolab.org). While such
contextual phenomena are often explained away as
incidental consequences of the intensity differences
across a stimulus, few now would hold this view, as it is
straightforward to create stimuli that are not consistent
with this sort of interpretation (as shown in Figure 2).
Rather, the effects of context, even in the simplest of
illusions, are determined by whether the added infor-
mation makes the stimulus more or less consistent with
one source or another. 
Thus, when identical simultaneous brightness
contrast stimuli (as in Figure 2A) are embedded in
scenes that change their probable sources (as in Figure
2B), the relative brightness of the targets changes
accordingly. In the left panel in Figure 2B, the stimuli are
now consistent with two differently reflective objects,
under different conditions of illumination, with the con-
sequence that the difference in apparent brightness of
the targets is dramatically increased. In the right panel
of Figure 2B, however, where the context is consistent
with similarly reflective surfaces (on differently reflective
surrounds), the targets now appear nearly identical in
brightness. Thus, the strength of the brightness ‘illusion’
in Figure 1 varies according to its probable sources
according to past experience. What is true for bright-
ness is also true for other perceptual attributes, such as
colour, motion, form, and depth (again, see www.lotto-
lab.org for examples). 
Thus, the colours we see represent the empirical sig-
nificance of inherently ambiguous stimuli in past expe-
rience, which creates at least two requirements for
explaining vision. The first is to fully quantify an
animal’s ecological history, not just in terms of the pat-
terns of light that fall on the eye [19], but also the prob-
abilistic relationship between stimuli and their sources
[20]. As this information is currently lacking, most prob-
abilistic models include general assumptions about the
world and its relation to the observers. While some
assumptions may be intuitive, they are frequently arbi-
trary simplifications, and/or assumptions based on
post hoc agreement between the predictions of the
model and psychophysical (behavioural) data. The
second requirement is to compare animals from differ-
ent ecological/statistical histories. Without this infor-
mation, it will not be possible to directly test the
adaptive, causal relationship between stimuli, pro-
cessing and perception. 
In principle, both aims could be met by raising
animals within carefully constructed spectral environ-
ments that specifically, and quantitatively alter the
animal’s experience towards ambiguous spectral stimuli
— rather than simply depriving it of normal experience
— and then correlating this known experience with
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Figure 2. An illustration of the empirical basis for illusions of
colour (see text for description).
ensuing biases in visual circuitry and perception. In
other words, by taking advantage of developmental
mechanisms, which presumably evolved to adapt vision
to the more subtle statistics of ontogenetic experience
(arising from variations in genetic and epigenetic deter-
minants), developmental neuroscience could be integral
in explaining how and why we see what we do. 
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